

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 ANKARA 1723

NODIS

FOR NIMETZ AND VEST

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PEPR, MASS, TU, GR, CY, US
SUBJECT: TURKISH PROPOSALS AND CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS

REF: A) STATE 53855, B) STATE 55984, C) STATE 56244,
D) STATE 57426

1. IN A TWO-STEP SEQUENCE, WE HAVE DISCUSSED WITH MFA THE QUESTIONS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE HEARINGS DATES AND OUR NEEDS WITH REGARD TO SUPPORT OF THE DCA AT THE HEARINGS. LATE MARCH 6 POL COUNS INFORMED CYPRUS-GREECE DIRECTOR GUVENDIREN OF THE TENTATIVE RESCHEDULING OF HEARINGS FOR APRIL 4 AND PASSED ON THE EXPLANATIONS IN REF. A. HE STRESSED AGAIN THE ADMINISTRATION'S NEED FOR INFORMATION ABOUT THE TURKISH PROPOSALS ON CYPRUS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND REITERATED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE PROPOSALS BE FORTHCOMING ENOUGH TO PERSUADE OUTSIDERS THAT THE TURKISH SIDE IS SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN RESOLVING THE PROBLEM (REF B). THE FOLLOWING MORNING, MFA SEC GEN ELEKDAG CALLED ME IN AND WE HAD A LENGTHY, DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THESE AND RELATED TOPICS.

2. THE CONGRESSIONAL PROCESS --

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A. ELEKDAG OBSERVED THAT THE DATE OF HEARINGS HAD KEPT RECEDING OVER THE LAST SIX MONTHS AND THAT THE JUSTIFICATION ADVANCED FOR THE LATEST DELAY LEFT HIM WONDERING WHAT OUR REAL MOTIVATION WAS. LAST SEPTEMBER WE TALKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF HEARINGS IN DECEMBER. HE RECALLED THAT THE LAST DATE WHICH NIMETZ HAD MENTIONED WAS MARCH 13-14. TELLING HIM I COULD SPEAK FROM LONG EXPERIENCE IN

DEALING WITH CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, I EXPLAINED THE DIFFICULTIES OF SCHEDULING HEARINGS. I TOLD HIM I HAD BELIEVED FROM THE BEGINNING THAT IT WAS MOST REASONABLE TO EXPECT THE HEARINGS TO BE HELD WITHIN THE WINDOW OF MARCH-APRIL-MAY, BUT THERE COULD BE NO GUARANTEE THAT ANY DATE--INCLUDING APRIL 4--COULD BE KEPT WITHOUT CHANGE. AS MANY AS 75 PERCENT OF THE HEARINGS IN WHICH I HAD PARTICIPATED HAD BEEN RESCHEDULED AT THE LAST MINUTE. MY OPINION WAS THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO LOOK FOR HIDDEN MOTIVATIONS BEHIND THE RESCHEDULING; HARD AS IT MIGHT BE FOR ANYONE WHO HAD NOT OPERATED IN WASHINGTON TO UNDERSTAND, FREQUENT RESCHEDULING OF HEARINGS WAS JUST A FACT OF LIFE THERE.

B. ELEKDAG SEEMED WILLING TO ACCEPT THIS ADVICE, BUT WANTED AN ESTIMATE OF HOW LONG THE ENTIRE CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE WOULD TAKE, RECALLING ECEVIT'S NEED TO HAVE THE SITUATION CLARIFIED BEFORE THE NATO SUMMIT MEETING. I EXPLAINED THE STEPS IN THE APPROVAL PROCESS AND SAID THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTIMATE WHEN IT WOULD BE FINISHED. HOWEVER, I POINTED OUT THAT THE CRITICAL STEP WAS THE SUBCOMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION, WHICH WE PROBABLY WOULD KNOW JUST AFTER THE HEARINGS.

3. NEED FOR INFORMATION ON PROPOSALS --

A. I TOLD ELEKDAG THAT WE WOULD NEED ABOUT TWO OR THREE WEEKS TO PREPARE FOR THE HEARINGS. FOR HEARINGS ON APRIL 4, WE WOULD BEGIN PREPARING TESTIMONY THE WEEK OF MARCH 13.

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AT THAT TIME WE WOULD NEED INFORMATION ON THE TURKISH PROPOSALS SO THAT THE SECRETARY COULD PLAN TO TESTIFY ON THAT BASIS. ON THE ADVICE OF CONGRESSIONAL FRIENDS OF THE DCA, THE SECRETARY FEELS THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT HE BE ABLE TO SAY THAT THE U.S. KNOWS ENOUGH ABOUT THE PROPOSALS THAT HE CAN ASSURE THE SUBCOMMITTEE THAT THE TURKISH SIDE IS REALLY INTERESTED IN SETTLING THE DISPUTE AND THAT THEIR PROPOSALS CONSTITUTE A REASONABLE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION. SUCH A POSITION WOULD HELP SOME CONGRESSMEN WHO HAVE PREVIOUSLY SUPPORTED THE EMBARGO AND MIGHT BE READY TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION AS LONG AS THIS CAN BE RELATED IN SOME WAY TO A CHANGE IN THE PROSPECTS ON CYPRUS. I SAID THAT WE KNOW THE GOT'S PROBLEMS AND WHAT PRIMIN ECEVIT HAS TOLD US ABOUT HIS RESOLVE, BUT WE NEED TO DISCUSS WHETHER ANYTHING CAN BE DONE TO HELP US MEET OUR PROBLEM. THE IDEAL ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE A BRIEFING FOR THE U.S. THE WEEKS OF MARCH 13 OR MARCH 20, FOLLOWED BY A MORE PUBLICIZED BRIEFING JUST BEFORE THE HEARINGS. THE INITIAL, CLASSIFIED BRIEFING COULD BE GIVEN US HERE, OR A GOT REPRESENTATIVE COULD GO TO WASHINGTON FOR DIRECT CONTACT. WHETHER THIS ARRANGEMENT OR SOME OTHER IS USED, THE ADMINISTRATION FACES A VERY DIFFICULT

AND EXTREMELY IMPORTANT FIGHT AND NEEDS ASSISTANCE.

B. ELEKDAG INQUIRED WHEN THE PRESIDENTIAL DECISION TO ASK FOR APPROVAL OF THE DCA WOULD BE MADE, AND I TOLD HIM IT WOULD HAVE TO BE FAR ENOUGH IN ADVANCE OF THE HEARINGS TO PERMIT PREPARATION AND PLANNING OF TESTIMONY. THEN TURNING DIRECTLY TO OUR NEED FOR INFORMATION, ELEKDAG REMINDED ME THAT NIMETZ HAD RAISED THIS QUESTION WITH ECEVIT, WHO HAD BEEN QUITE CLEAR IN DESCRIBING THE CONSTRAINTS ON THE TURKISH SIDE. ECEVIT HAD SPECIFICALLY STRESSED THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF AN "ORGANIC LINK" BETWEEN CYPRUS AND THE DCA. HOWEVER, ELEKDAG SAID, HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT THAT THE CYPRUS PROBLEM WOULD BE BROACHED DURING THE ECEVIT-CARAMANLIS SUMMIT TALKS AND THAT ECEVIT WOULD DISCUSS IN GENERAL
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TERMS-- BUT NOT IN DETAIL--WHAT HE HAS IN MIND TO PROPOSE. IF THAT DOES OCCUR, THEN AFTER

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THE SUMMIT WE WOULD BE GIVEN A BRIEFING ABOUT WHAT WAS SAID AND IN THIS CONTEXT COULD BE INFORMED OF THE GIST OF THE TURKISH PROPOSALS ON CYPRUS. ELEKDAG CAUTIONED THAT THIS WAS STRICTLY A PERSONAL POSITION AND THAT SUCH A BRIEFING WOULD REQUIRE THE PRIMIN'S APPROVAL. THINKING OUT LOUD, HE SAID THAT THE GOT WOULD NOT WANT IT TO APPEAR THAT THE

U.S. HAD RECEIVED THE INFORMATION DIRECTLY FROM TURKEY
AND THAT PERHAPS WE COULD REQUEST INFORMATION FROM THE OTHER
SIDE AS WELL.

C. I TOLD ELEKDAG THAT WE COULD PROTECT A CLASSIFIED
BRIEFING BUT THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT WE KNOW ENOUGH
TO BE ABLE TO SAY HONESTLY TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE THAT
WE BELIEVE THE PROPOSALS OFFER A GOOD BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION.
I SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS THEY SHOULD THINK OF PROVIDING
US WITH WHAT THEY BETIEVE THE ADMINISTRATION'S TESTIMONY
NOULD INCLUDE ABOUT THEIR PROPOSALS.

4. THE RISK OF REJECTION --

A. I MENTIONED THAT IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF WE
HAD A GREEK-CYPRIOIOT REJECTION OF THE PROPOSALS JUST
BEFORE THE DCA HEARINGS. ELEKDAG SAID THAT HE DID NOT
THINK THAT ECEVIT WOULD GIVE CARAMANLIS A DETAILED
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PRESENTATION OF THE PROPOSALS (I.E., ENOUGH TO BE THE
BASIS FOR A DEFINITIVE REJECTION) BUT WOULD LIMIT
HIMSELF TO EVIDENCE OF GOOD WILL.

B. I WENT ON TO NOTE THAT IT WOULD BE IDEAL IF ECEVIT
WERE ABLE TO PERSUADE CARAMANLIS NOT TO REJECT OR
DENOUNCE THE TURKISH PROPOSALS. ELEKDAG COUNTERED THAT SUCH
AN EXPECTATION WOULD BE VERY OPTIMISTIC. HE PREDICTED
THAT WHATEVER TURKEY PROPOSED, THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD
REJECT IT, AND THAT GREECE WOULD JOIN THE GREEK CYPRIOTS.
KYPRIANOU'S INVESTITURE SPEECH HAD BEEN VERY DISCOURAGING,
HE SAID. I SAID THAT IN VIEW OF WHAT ECEVIT HAD TOLD NIMETZ
AND ME ABOUT CARAMANLIS, I HAD A MORE HOPEFUL VIEW OF THE
LATTER'S ATTITUDE. ELEKDAG, HOWEVER, INSISTED THAT
BOTH THE GREEKS AND THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAVE SHOWN IN THEIR
PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT THEY DO NOT SEEK THE RESOLUTION OF
THE CYPRUS QUESTION BUT MAINTENANCE OF THE EMBARGO
AS THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THEIR FOREIGN POLICY. I SUGGESTED
THAT IT WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR THEM NOW TO REJECT THE
TURKISH PROPOSALS AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE BY
SO DOING THEY WOULD BE DEFYING ADVICE FROM BOTH US AND
FROM THE U.K. ELEKDAG OBSERVED THAT CARAMANLIS SHOWS
CONFLICTING ATTITUDES TOWARD TURKEY. IF CARAMANLIS
WANTS GREECE REINTEGRATED INTO NATO, HE SAID, HE SHOULD
NOT MAKE GREECE'S POLICY A HOSTAGE TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS.

5. QUALITY OF TURKISH PROPOSALS --

A. ELEKDAG SAID THAT IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH NIMETZ
IN WASHINGTON LAST FALL, THE DCA APPROVAL PROCEDURE
WAS NOT MADE DEPENDENT ON THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE. "I
DON'T WANT TO NEGOTIATE WITH YOU ON THIS ISSUE," HE SAID.
HE MADE CLEAR, IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTIONS, THAT HE WAS

CONCERNED THAT IF WE ARE BRIEFED ABOUT THE TURKISH
PROPOSALS, WE WOULD RESPOND WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR
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IMPROVING THEM.

B. I TOLD HIM THAT I UNDERSTOOD HIS CONCERN. HOWEVER,
I REVIEWED ONCE MORE THE ADMINISTRATION'S NEED FOR THE
STRONGEST POSSIBLE POSITION AS IT PREPARES FOR A TOUGH
FIGHT IN CONGRESS. IN ASKING FOR INFORMATION, WE ARE
TRYING TO BUILD A STRONGER CASE FOR THE CONGRESS RATHER
THAN LOOKING FOR A TECHNIQUE TO ALTER THE TURKISH PROPOSALS.

C. ELEKDAG AGAIN SAID THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO THINK
ABOUT HOW THEY COULD MEET OUR NEED, BUT THAT HE BELIEVED THEY
WOULD TRY THE IDEA OF A POST-SUMMIT BRIEFING WHICH THEY
COULD JUSTIFY AS PART OF THE NORMAL PRACTICE OF BRIEFING
ALLIES. HOWEVER, HE AGAIN CAUTIONED THAT HE HAD NO
CLEARANCE TO DISCUSS THIS IDEA.

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6. GREEK PROPAGANDA AGAINST TURKEY--

THE FINAL STAGE OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN GOT AND THE
TURKISH CYPRIOTS IS BEING HELD RIGHT NOW, ELEKDAG SAID.
DENTASH HAD COME TO ANKARA AND WAS SHOWING A VERY
CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE. BUT BY CONTRAST, AT THE SAME
TIME GREEK DEFENSE MINISTER AVEROFF IS TRAVELLING
THROUGH THE U.S. CAMPAIGNING AGAINST THE DCA AND TRYING

TO TURN U.S. PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST TURKEY. ELEKDAG THOUGHT THAT THE USG COULD HAVE DONE SOMETHING TO DISCOURAGE SUCH A CAMPAGIN AT SUCH A TIME. I SUGGESTED IN RESPONSE THAT THERE WAS LITTLE THE U.S. COULD DO TO PREVENT THIS; FURTHERMORE, BLATANT ATTEMPTS TO MANIPULATE U.S. PUBLIC OPINION COULD BACKFIRE.

7. COMMITMENTS FROM PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH NIMETZ--

A. ELEKDAG RECALLED THAT THE GOT REPRESENTATIVES HAD RAISED WITH NIMETZ THE PROBLEM OF THE PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE DATE OF THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AND NIMETZ HAD UNDERTAKEN TO EXPLORE THIS ISSUE WITH WALDHEIM AND SUPPORT THE TURKISH SUGGESTIONS. SO FAR AS HE KNEW, HE SAID, NOTHING HAS BEEN DONE BY THE U.S. TO URGE WALDHWIM TO ACCEPT THIS PROCEDURE. HE ALSO THOUGHT WALDHEIM SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT IT WAS THE GREEKS WHO ASKED FOR POSTPONEMENT
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OF THE TALKS. A NUMBER OF EMBASSIES IN ANKARA LABORED UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS THE TURKS WHO WERE TRYING TO DELAY MATTERS.

B. ELEKDAG ALSO RECALLED THAT U.S. SAID IT WOULD CONSIDER MAKING A PUBLIC STATEMENT URGING THE GREEKS AND GREEK CYPRIOTS NOT TO REJECT THE TURKISH PROPOSALS OUT OF HAND. GOT HAD BEEN PLEASED WITH JUDD'S STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT, BUT THE U.S., IN CONTRAST, HAD SAID NOTHING. I NOTED THAT THIS POINT HAD BEEN MADE FORCEFULLY TO THE GREEKS AND CYPRIOTS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS, BUT THAT I WOULD RAISE WITH WASHINGTON THE IDEA OF MAKING IT IN A MORE PUBLIC WAY.

8. COMMENT: I BELIEVE WE DEFUSED ELEKDAG'S SUSPICIONS ABOUT A HIDDEN MOTIVATION AS A RESULT OF WHAT HE SEES AS A SIX MONTHS' SUCCESSION OF DELAYS IN PROMISED HEARINGS. HOWEVER, WE ARE LEFT WITH A VERY DIFFICULT PROBLEM IN PROVIDING THE SECRETARY WITH ENOUGH INFORMATION ABOUT THE TURKISH PROPOSALS TO PERMIT HIM TO TESTIFY THAT HE KNOWS ENOUGH ABOUT THEM TO SAY CONFIDENTLY THAT THEY WILL CONSTITUTE A REASONABLE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION. I THINK ELEKDAG SEES QUITE CLEARLY WHAT OUR PROBLEM IS AND WILL DO WHATEVER HE CAN TO HELP. HOWEVER, AS NIMETZ WILL RECALL, ECEVIT HAS STRONG FEELINGS ABOUT THIS. HE WILL NOT DO ANYTHING THAT ACCEPTS EVEN INDIRECTLY THE EXISTENCE OF A LINKAGE BETWEEN THE DCA AND CYPRUS. IF HE PROVIDES US INFORMATION ABOUT TURKISH PROPOSALS OUT OF PHASE, SO TO SPEAK, AND BEFORE THEY ARE GIVEN TO WALDHEIM OR THE GREEKS, HE RUNS THIS RISK. THE TURKS ARE, OF COURSE, DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS ALSO THAT WHAT WE WANT TO DO IS GET OUR HANDS ON THE PROPOSALS IN ORDER TO PRESSURE THE TURKS TO CHANGE THEM BY POINTING OUT HOW, HERE AND THERE,

CHANGES WOULD "IMPROVE" THE PROSPECTS FOR CONGRESSIONAL
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ACTION ON THE DCA. ALSO, ECEVIT DOES NOT WANT TO DO
ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT UNDERMINE THE INTEGRITY OF THE
POSITION (OR FICTION) THAT THESE ARE TURKISH CYPRIOT
PROPOSALS, TO WHICH THE GOT GIVES ITS SUPPORT. FINALLY,
I SUSPECT THAT THE TURKS ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE PROSPECTS
OF LEAKAGE FROM OUR SIDE.

10. THEY WILL PONDER THESE MATTERS, AND I AM
SURE THAT ELEKDAG WILL PROMPTLY CONSULT WITH ECEVIT ON
IT. I THINK, HOWEVER, THAT THE TURKS REALIZE THAT WE
CANNOT GO TO CONGRESS AND SAY THAT THE PROPOSALS
ARE GOOD ONES BECAUSE THE TURKS TOLD US THEY WOULD BE
GOOD ONES. NEVERTHELESS, THE PROBLEMS FOR THE TURKS ARE
REAL ONES ALSO.

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